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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-AGREEMENT NOT TO BE
PERFORMED WITHIN A LIFETIME.-It was claimed that under an
alleged oral agreement made by the testator to his wife prior to their
marriage, the former would designate the latter ultimate beneficiary
of a life insurance policy in the sum of $50,000, in consideration of
her giving up her business and marrying him. Shortly after the
announcement of their engagement, the testator designated the claim-
ant as his beneficiary. However, soon after they were married, the
testator changed the beneficiary to his sister, who was ultimately paid
the proceeds of the policy at the death of the testator. Held, the
alleged oral agreement, or promise, was void under the provision of
the Statute of Frauds requiring a contract "whose performance is
not to be completed before the end of a lifetime to be in writing." 1
In re Keeler's Estate, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 61 (1945).
Plaintiff's contention that the agreement was performed as she
had done her part in giving up her business and marrying testator, is
untenable for it is a well established rule in New York that nothing
short of full performance will remove an oral agreement from the
operation of the statute.2 Plaintiff further relied on the designation
of herself in the policy as beneficiary prior to the change as a memo-
randum which would fulfill the provision calling for a written state-
ment. But it is settled law that in order to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, the memorandum must state the entire contract.3
New York courts, even prior to the amendment of subdivision
one by the Laws of 1933, had long realized the necessity of having
the facts of such oral agreements critically scrutinized by the triers
when offered against dead persons' estates, as such agreements were
often easy to fabricate and hard to disprove. 4 They were of the
opinion that in the interests of public policy and justice, claims against
the estates of dead men should be established by very satisfactory
evidence, and that the courts should see to it that such estates were
fairly protected against unfounded and rapacious raids.
The New York Legislature in its Laws of 1935 amending sub-
division one by adding the phrase "or which cannot be performed
within a lifetime" intended to prevent the assertion of claims against
funds of deceased persons after their death, when the person alleged
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 31.
2 David Taylor Co. v. Fansteel Products Co., 234 App. Div. 548, 255 N. Y.
Supp. 270 (1932); Cullota v. Banana Sales Corp., 142 Misc. 149, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 84 (1931); Tyler v. Windels, 186 App. Div. 698, 174 N. Y. Supp. 762.
aff'd, 227 N. Y. 589, 125 N. E. 926 (1919).
3 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. of N. Y., 216 N. Y. 310, 110
N. E. 619 (1915); 17 W. 50th Street Corp. v. Tolerton, 107 Misc. 609, 177
N. Y. Supp. 897 (1919); Lench v. Wall, 129 App. Div. 688, 114 N. Y. Supp.
234 (1908).
4 Matter of Block's Estate, 258 App. Div. 342, 346, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 674,
678 (1940).
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to have made the oral agreement is no longer able to make a denial.5
In the present case, the court dismissed the complaint for to do
otherwise would be to frustrate the above intention of the legislature.
It was further intended by the legislature that this provision was to
cover agreements made to take effect at or after death, 6 and inasmuch
as in this case the alleged agreement could not be completed until
the promisor's death, it was void. This is directly in line with the
majority of decisions in New York. In a recent case 7 in point, it
was held that an oral agreement by an employee irrevocably designat-
ing plaintiff sole beneficiary of employee's interest at his death in
New York City Retirement Fund was void under this same provision
of the Statute of Frauds.
The intention of the legislature in passing a statute of frauds
and this amendment has always been to prevent fraud. Consequently
if the court had upheld the claim, the evils against which the statute
was aimed would continue. There still would be possible the type
of litigation which is based upon alleged oral promises of persons no
longer able to make denials. There still would be the opportunity
for exactions from deceaseds' estates because the representatives of
the estates were unable to meet the allegations of claimant or felt
compelled in a spirit of caution to make settlement of "strike" claims
rather than risk heavier loss on unjustifiable claims which might
deceive a court or jury.
G.R.
DOMEsTIc RELATIONS-DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS.-New
York courts, in two decisions recently handed down, have shown
themselves to be stringent enforcers of the "clean hands" maxim. In
the case of Cole v. Cole, a decree of annulment was granted the re-
spondent on the ground that he was induced into marriage with the
appellant by her false and fraudulent statements that she was "with
child". The appellant, an employee in the home of the respondent's
parents, had been indulging in illicit relations with the respondent
for many months when she began to evidence signs of what she
claimed to be pregnancy. A physician, called on the respondent's
behalf at the trial, testified that he was visited by the appellant prior
to the marriage and the symptoms she evidenced would indicate preg-
nancy to a layman. Under pressure from the appellant, and realizing
that if she were pregnant, he was the father, respondent married her.
Some time after the marriage, while she and the respondent were
riding in an automobile, the appellant confided to him information to
the effect that she had intentionally misrepresented her condition in
5 Matter of Quigley's Estate, 179 Misc. 210, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 330 (1942).
6 In re Ditson's Estate, 177 Misc. 648, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 468 (1941).
7 Bayreuther v. Reinish, 264 App. Div. 138, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 674, aff'd,
290 N. Y. 553 (1942).
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